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Abstract
Cooperatives in agricultural and horticultural markets have faced problems in
responding to the increasing differentiation in demand as well as supply. One
response is the emergence of growers’ associations. They are not vertically integrated
forward into a processor/retailer stage of production like cooperatives. This gives
processors/retailers the freedom to invest in the direction they most like, given the
increasing differentiation in demand. Growers’ associations face on the supply side a
trade off between self-selection and countervailing power regarding the increasing
differentiation in supply. Heterogeneous growers’ associations frustrate high quality
growers due to the policy of uniform treatment of members, but they are strong in
terms of countervailing power of the growers collectively. The opposite holds for
homogeneous growers’ associations.
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21 Introduction
For many decades the Dutch horticultural auction has been a very efficient
organisation for the marketing of horticultural products. While the auction still is the
main instrument for selling ornamentals, in fruit and vegetable it has lost its dominant
position. Nowadays, most Dutch fresh produce is sold by way of contract mediation,
and the auction clock is mainly used for residual supply. With this change in sales
mechanism, the auction organisation has lost its central position in the marketing of
fresh produce. Wholesalers who used to purchase at the auction now contract directly
with growers, and growers have established new organisations to bargain with
wholesalers or retailers. The marketing structure for fruit and vegetables in The
Netherlands has become much more diverse, with many new organisations being set
up and many new trade relationships being established. In response to shifting market
conditions and the inability of the auction to accommodate these changes, growers of
fruit and vegetables have set up new growers associations. These growers associations
are usually organised around a specific crop.
We will analyse the emergence of grower associations from the lens of
governance structure choice. The governance structure of an organisation entails the
allocation of decision and income rights (Hansmann, 1996), i.e. the governance
structure determines who has control over using the assets of an organisation and who
receives income from using those assets. Within both a marketing cooperative and a
growers’ association decision rights are allocated democratically to a certain extent,
that is, each member of the cooperative/association has a minimum of one vote. Some
cooperatives/associations use the one-member-one-vote principle, others use a
differentiated voting system. In the latter case, members have votes in proportion to
their patronage of the cooperative/association. Regarding the income right,
cooperatives/grower associations are governed by the equality principle, i.e.
differences in the quality of produce are to a certain extent not recognized in the
remuneration scheme.
The emergence of growers’ associations seems to be a response of growers  to
the increasing differentiation in demand as well as supply in agrifood markets.
Hendrikse and Veerman (2001) have addressed the increasing differentiation on the
demand side of agrifood markets from the perspective of the allocation of decision
rights.2 They argue that the increasing differentiation on the demand side requires
specialized assets, like the establishment of brand names, at the processing, wholesale
and retail stage of the production and distribution chain. These activities will not
blossom in traditional marketing cooperatives due to the focus on the interests of
farmers. They predict that the governance structure marketing cooperative is less
attractive in these markets and will be replaced by a governance structure which
resembles market exchange. However, they do not address the design of such a
governance structure. In their words ‘An important topic for future research is
therefore to investigate the possibilities regarding the design of a governance structure
which on the one hand maintains the special character of a marketing cooperative and
on the other hand eliminates the inefficiencies associated with this governance
structure’.
The response to the increasing variation on the supply side in terms of quality
                                                                
2 This is in line with the incomplete contracting models of Grossman and Hart  (1986) and Hart and
Moore (1990) The focus on the allocation of decision rights as the distinguishing feature between
governance structures corresponds with how we usually characterize  the differences between investor
owned firms, marketing cooperatives, labor managed firms, and so on.
3seems also problematic in marketing cooperative. The uniform treatment of members
in a marketing cooperative seems to play an important role in this respect. As growers
want to supply more differentiated products to meet consumer demand for more
variety and higher quality, it may be difficult for marketing cooperatives to
accommodate this differentiation. Marketing of differentiated products may require
substantially higher investments, as each product requires a unique marketing
strategy. Moreover, given that the marketing cooperative sells a bundle of products to
its customers, it may be very difficult to make detailed allocations of all its activities
(i.e., costs) to each product and each supplier. Thus, fair remuneration of each quality
supplied by the growers remains a source of conflict.
This article views a grower association as a governance structure which
resembles market exchange. We distinguish homogeneous and heterogeneous grower
associations. All members of a homogeneous growers’ association produce the same
quality of a crop, whereas differences in quality prevail between the members in a
heterogeneous growers’ association. Both types of growers’ associations have an
identical allocation of decision as well as income rights, but the diversity among
farmers/growers implies that individual earnings differ between the different types of
grower associations. The effect of the equality principle regarding income rights
drives therefore our analysis.
The increasing differentiation on the supply side of agrifood markets is
analyzed by focussing on the trade off between self-selection and countervailing
power in these grower associations. The diversity among farmers/growers is
responsible for this trade off. Self-selection entails that members with identical
characteristics organize themselves in a homogeneous growers’ association. This is
attractive for farmers with high quality produce because they are now able to
appropriate the benefits of their efforts / investments to a larger extent. However, a
disadvantage of the emergence of (small) specialized growers’ associations is that
they have lower countervailing power compared to an (heterogeneous) association
combining all growers. We investigate subsequently the effect of self-selection and
countervailing power on the incentive to invest and determine the choice of
governance structure in an incomplete contracting model.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the emergence of
growers’ associations. Section 3 develops a model which features the tradeoff
between self-selection and countervailing power. The choice of governance structure
is addressed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Growers’ associations
In the early 1990s, Dutch fruit and vegetable growers became aware that the
conditions in the European market for fresh produce were changing. First, consumer
demand had changed. As the supply of fruit, vegetables and mushrooms is abundant
and income is rising, consumers demand higher quality, more convenience and more
variety. Also issues of food safety, environmental impact and other concerns about the
production process play a more prominent role in purchase decisions. Second,
internationalisation (or globalisation) has also affected the market for fruit and
vegetables. Since the 1980s competition for Dutch fruit and vegetables in northwest-
European markets has become much stronger. While the growth of consumer demand
slowed down, production continued to expand in most European countries.
Particularly the accession to the EU of Spain and Portugal in 1986 has given an
enormous boost to the production of vegetables in Spain and its export to north-west
4Europe. Third, food retail has become very concentrated in north-west Europe in
recent years (ISMEA, 1999). Reasons for consolidation in food retail are the building
of strong negotiating position vis-à-vis suppliers, and obtaining sufficient scale for
private label products and investments in advertising and information technologies.
Fourth, fruit and vegetables have become a very important product category for the
major retail chains. Not only are they a good source of profit, they are also of strategic
importance in building store image (Bech-Larsen, 2000).
The traditional auction had great difficulty to accommodate all these changes.
Increasing dissatisfaction occurred, both on the selling and on the buying side. The
auction, used to sell large numbers of products from anonymous suppliers to
anonymous purchasers, was not equipped to exchange information of particular
buyers to particular producers. Special demands of the large retailers, for instance in
case of sales promotions, could not be met. Retailers increasingly started to look for
other sources of supply. Wholesalers working for these retailers had the same
complaints. They had to have buying agents at different auction at the same time to be
able to buy enough produce to supply their main clients. But also on the production
side, among certain growers, dissatisfaction with the auction system appeared. For
instance, large growers felt that the cost allocation system of the auction – paying a
percentage of sales as auction fee – was subsidizing small growers. But most
dissatisfaction appeared among those growers that saw new market opportunities for
higher quality and specialty products.
Innovative growers wanted to react to consumer demand for more variety and
higher quality products by trying new crop varieties, often in close collaboration with
a seed company. They experienced that the auction system does not support such
differentiation, for at least three reasons. First, specialty products require a special
marketing effort, for which the auction does not have the expertise. Most auctions did
not want to start productspecific marketing activities, as it did not fit with the
traditional policy of anonymous products and collective promotion. In the democratic
decision making process on the policies of the auction organisation, the votes of the
innovative growers were far too few to be able to force a change of strategy. Second,
the auction clock may have been a very efficient sales mechanism for generic
products, it provided a disincentive for product differentiation. At the auction
location, all fruits and vegetables were sorted into quality classes. The lots that were
brought before the auction clock represented one quality class, but often contained
products from different growers. This type of bundling affects a grower’s production
decisions in two ways. Producing for an anonymous market gives an incentive to
supply generic products, that is, products demanded by most of the buyers. There is
no incentive to answer the special demands of one customer. Moreover, a grower does
not have an incentive to increase product quality. As there is always some variation in
a quality class, the grower will supply products with quality characteristics that are
just above the lower boundary of the quality class targeted. Because targeting a higher
position in the same quality class requires higher production costs but does not give
him a higher price, the grower does not have an incentive to raise product quality
above a level that is just above the lower minimum requirements of the quality class.
Third, because being member of the cooperative auction obliges a grower to supply
all its produce to the auction, there was (officially) no opportunity to find an
alternative sales channel for the more innovative products. In reality, growers did try
out alternative sales channels as they directly contracted a small part of their products
with wholesalers, and found out they could receive a higher price than through the
auction.
5In reaction to changing market conditions and to dissatisfaction among both
suppliers and buyers, several cooperative horticultural auctions started a
reorganisation process. A major element of this process was a further concentration
among cooperative auctions and a restructuring of several of these organisations into
marketing firms (Bijman et al., 2000). By setting up mediation agencies within their
organisation, the cooperative auctions now also facilitate direct contracting between
buyers and sellers. Price discovery for this kind of sales transaction is no longer done
through the auction clock, but by negotiation between auction employees (on behalf
of the producers) and wholesalers or retailers. As these type of transactions often
include agreements for a longer period (usually up to a year), this kind of sales
mediation has the advantage that demands of individual clients can be rewarded. The
producer still has the advantage of being member of a large organisation that can
profit from scale economies and can protect him from contracting risks. Another
reorganisation among the traditional auctions is the (further) concentration by
merging into very large marketing organisations. The three largest farmer-owned
marketing organisations – VTN/The Greenery, Veiling ZON and Fruitmasters – are
all the result of recent mergers among regional auctions. Further restructuring is
taking place among these marketing organisations, as they reduce the amount of
products brought before the auction clock, and as they engaged in wholesale activities
(in case of The Greenery).
Partly in response to the new market opportunities and partly in reaction to the
restructuring process among the auction, new growers’ associations have been set up.
Even before the mergers, growers had left the auction to set up their own associations
to bargain directly with wholesalers. But after The Greenery was established, even a
larger number of associations were set up. Once the economies of scale, as they
existed in the auction, were no longer important (the auction clock was no longer
used), growers experienced they could do the bargaining with wholesalers themselves.
Two types of new growers’ associations have been established in reaction to changes
in market conditions and changes in the cooperative auction.
The first type of new growers’ association is primarily an interest organisation,
representing the (common) interests of the members vis-a-vis another organisation (or
government agency). Those members of Greenery, ZON or Fruitmasters producing
the same crop or crop variety have established a growers’ association to defend their
interests within the cooperative marketing organisation. The desire to more actively
express crop specific interests is the result of the larger physical and mental distance
between members and cooperative marketing organisation. Particularly The Greenery
is actively pursuing a strategy of service provider to  major retail clients, and thus
keeping its members/suppliers at a greater distance from strategic and operational
decisions. In addition, the marketing efforts of The Greenery may lead to conflicts of
interests between various products. Management effort is a scarce good, and (human)
investments to promote one product are not necessarily equally beneficial to other
products and thus to other producers. Finally, the board of directors of the cooperative
is no longer deciding on operational matters (as was the case in traditional cooperative
auctions), and limits its control of the management of the marketing organisation to
the strategic decisions. In sum, changes in scale of operation, in functions and in
decision making structure was reason for growers/members to establish new
organisations to have their (product-specific) voice heard.
The second type of new growers’ associations consists of growers who have
left the cooperative auction. Already at the end of the 1980s innovative growers
contacted seed companies and exchanged information among each other about
6cultivation and marketing opportunities. As discussed above, the auction organisation
was not well positioned to promote such innovation activities. Continued refusal by
the auction organisation to start specific marketing programmes for these specialty
products in combination with positive experiences of marketing outside of the auction
lead to the decision of several of these innovative growers to establish their own
producer organisation. These new growers’ asssociations often took the legal form of
a cooperative in order to be able to able to carry out economic activities on behalf of
the members. For their sales activities these independent growers’ associations often
hire a sales specialist. Other activities taken up by the new cooperatives are quality
inspection, sorting, packaging and marketing. They focus on the top segment of the
fruit and vegetable market and have their own brand. Some contract directly with
retailers, others deal with wholesalers. Examples of these new cooperative growers
associations are Best Growers Benelux, Fossa Eugenia, Quality Queen Growers
Group and Rainbow Growers Group. Table 1 gives a list of cooperative growers
associations (including traditional auctions) that have been recognized by the Product
Board for Horticulture as  eligible for subsidies under the European Council
‘Regulation (EC) 2200/96 on the common organisation of the market for fruit and
vegetables’.
Table 1.  Recognized Producer Organisations in the Netherlands (August 2000)
Name number of members
Best Growers Benelux 40
Coöperatieve Champignonafzetvereniging Horst 5
Coöperatieve Telersvereniging Rijko 280
Fossa Eugenia 20
Fruitmasters Groep 1400
Nautilus 100
Quality Queen Growers Group 30
Rainbow Growers Group 60
Veiling Zaltbommel 350
Veiling Zuid-Limburg 100
Veiling Zundert 400
Veiling ZON 2400
Vers Direct Teelt 20
Voedingstuinbouw Nederland (VTN) 7250
Source: Product Board for Horticulture
3 Self selection versus market power
The distinguishing feature of a growers’ association is the equality principle
regarding the distribution of revenues as well as the delivery of output. The equality
principle regarding the distribution of revenues entails that each member receives the
same remuneration for a unit of output which is sold, regardless the quality of the
product. If a grower does not produce, then no remuneration is received. The equality
principle regarding the delivery of output entails that a certain quantity of demand is
met by proportionally delivering from the output of each grower, regardless the
quality.
7Homogeneous and heterogeneous growers’ associations are distinguished. All
members in a homogeneous growers’ association are identical, i.e. they all produce
the same amount of output and quality is identical. A heterogeneous growers’
association consists of at least two types of members. We assume that each member
produces the same amount of output, but the quality of the output differs.
3.1 Self selection
Suppose that there are two types of growers. Grower 1 produces one unit with
value A and grower 2 produces one unit with value B. Assume A > B, i.e. growers of
type 1 deliver products with high value and growers of type 2 produce low value
products. The value of the product of the grower will only be realised when a third
party is involved, e.g. a wholesaler.
Cooperative game theory will be used to analyze the effect of the choice of
grower association. A cooperative game is summarized by the characteristic function,
which consists of a set of players and a specification of a payoff for every possible
subset of the set of players. Three players are distinguished. Grower 1 is player 1,
grower 2 is player 2, and the wholesaler is player 3. The type of growers’ association
determines the payoff of a coalition of players. The outcome or equilibrium of a
cooperative game is a specification of a payoff for every player. The Shapley value
will be used as equilibrium concept (Shapley, 1953). It is an indication of the power
of each player and therefore an indication of the incentive to invest of each party.
The characteristic function of a homogeneous growers’ association is N=
{1,2,3}, v(Ø) = 0, v(1) = 0, v(2) = 0, v(3) = 0, v(12) = 0, v(13) = A, v(23) = B, v(123)
= A + B. The Shapley value is (A/2, B/2, (A + B)/2), i.e. party 1 receives A/2, party 2
receives B/2, and party 3 receives (A+B)/2. The analysis of a heterogeneous growers’
association is facilitated by defining I = {1,2}, i.e. I is the coalition of all growers. The
characteristic function of a heterogeneous growers’ association is N= {I,3}, v(Ø) = 0,
v(I) = 0, v(3) = 0, v(I3) = A + B. The Shapley value is ((A + B)/2, (A + B)/2).
Dividing (A+B)/2 equally over party 1 and 2 results in the Shapley value ((A + B)/4,
(A + B)/4, (A + B)/2).
Proposition 1: Grower 1 has a stronger incentive to invest in the homogeneous
growers’ association than in the heterogeneous growers’ association.
Proof: A/2 = (A+A)/4 > (A+B)/4 because A > B.
Proposition 2: Grower 2 has a weaker incentive to invest in the homogeneous
growers’ association than in the heterogeneous growers’ association.
Proof: B/2 = (B+B)/2 < (A+B)/4 because A > B.
The equality principle regarding income distribution in growers’ associations
results in an incentive to underinvest for the high quality grower in a heterogeneous
growers’ association. This will result in a process of adverse selection in a
heterogeneous growers’ association, that is, the high quality growers will leave the
heterogeneous growers’ association and will establish a homogeneous growers’
association consisting of only high quality growers.
Proposition 3: The power of the retailer is the same in each growers’ association.
Proof: The Shapley value of the retailer is (A+B)/2 in the homogeneous as well as the
heterogeneous growers’ association.
83.2 Market power
Proposition 3 entails that the power of grower 1 and 2 together is the same in
each growers’ association. They receive together half of the total surplus. There is in
the above model no change in the distribution of market power for the growers
collectively when they switch from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous growers’
association. The reason is that the total supply of the growers is equal to the total
demand of the retailer.
The effect of the choice of grower association on the distribution of market
power can be captured by reducing the demand of the wholesaler. This provides the
retailer with opportunities to create competition between the growers. Suppose that
the wholesaler wants to buy only one unit of the product of the growers, whereas each
grower is still producing one unit. The characteristic function of the homogeneous
growers’ association in this market with an abundance of supply is N= {1,2,3}, v(Ø)
= 0, v(1) = 0, v(2) = 0, v(3) = 0, v(12) = 0, v(13) = A, v(23) = B, v(123) = A. The
Shapley value is (A/2 – B/3, B/6, A/2 + B/6). The characteristic function of the
heterogeneous growers’ association is N= {I,3}, v(Ø) = 0, v(I) = 0, v(3) = 0, v(I3) =
(A + B)/2. (Notice that the equality principle regarding the delivery of output is
responsible for v(I3)=(A+B)/2.) The Shapley value is ((A + B)/4, (A + B)/4).
Decomposing this vector into the two growers results in ((A + B)/8, (A + B)/8, (A +
B)/4))
Proposition 4: The homogeneous growers’ association creates more value than the
heterogeneous growers’ association.
Proof: v(123) = A > v(I3) = (A + B)/2 because A > B.
Proposition 5: The wholesaler has more power with homogeneous growers’
associations than with a heterogeneous growers’ association.
Proof: The Shapley value of the wholesaler with homogeneous growers’ associations
is A/2 + B/6, while the total value is equal to A. The Shapley value of the wholesaler
with a heterogeneous growers’ association is (A + B)/4, while the total value is
(A+B)/2. The retailer has more power with homogeneous growers’ associations than
with a heterogeneous growers’ association because (A/2 + B/6)/A = 0,5 + B/6A >
((A+B)/4)/(A+B)/2 = 0,5.
The heterogeneous growers’ association can be viewed as a merger of
homogeneous growers’ associations. It creates countervailing power towards the
wholesaler, which the wholesaler does not like. The creation of homogeneous
growers’ associations undermines the countervailing power, i.e. the market power, of
the growers collectively. This is attractive for the wholesaler. The growers obtain half
of the total value with a heterogeneous growers’ association, i.e. (A+B)/2, whereas
they receive collectively less than half of the total value in homogeneous growers’
associations, i.e. A/2-B/6.
Proposition 6: Grower 2 prefers the heterogeneous growers’ association.
Proof: The Shapley value of grower 2 is (A+B)/8 in the heterogeneous growers’
association. The Shapley value of grower 2 is B/6 in the homogeneous growers’
association. Grower 2 prefers the heterogeneous growers’ association above
9homogeneous growers’ association for every value of A and B because (A + B)/8 >
(B + B)/8 = B/4 > B/6.
The equality principle as well as the countervailing power principle of a
heterogeneous growers’ association is beneficial for grower 2.
Proposition 7: Grower 1 prefers the homogeneous growers’ association above the
heterogeneous growers’ association when 9A/11 > B.
Proof: Grower 1 prefers the homogeneous growers’ association above the heterogeous
growers’ association when (A/2 – B/3) > (A + B)/8, i.e. 9A/11 > B.
Grower 1 prefers the heterogeneous growers’ association when the difference
between the two growers is not too large. The disadvantageous equality principle of
the heterogeneous growers’ association for grower 1 is in that situation not strong
enough to eliminate the advantageous countervailing power effect. However, the
tendency in agrifood markets seems to be an increase in the difference between A and
B. Proposition 7 implies that the high quality growers will form a homogeneous
growers’ association in order to escape the equality principle of a heterogeneous
growers’ association. The benefits of adverse selection for the high quality growers is
larger than the loss of countervailing power. The wholesaler gains in two ways from
this adverse selection effect. First the size of the total pie increases from (A+B)/2 to
A. Second, the wholesaler will obtain a larger share of the pie because there are now
two growers’ associations instead of one, which results in competition between the
two homogeneous growers’ associations.
4 Governance structure choice and investment
The previous section has addressed the way in which the benefits of
investment will be distributed in the two growers’ associations. However, it has been
silent on the costs of investment. This section will address the choice of governance
structure when the costs of investment are taken into account. Our analysis is in line
with the standard model of governance structure choice (Grossman and Hart, 1986
and Hart and Moore, 1990). It entails a non-cooperative game in which the first stage
consists of the choice of governance structure and the second stage of the investment
decision.
The distribution of bargaining power in the first stage of the game is
determined by the choice of governance structure. Bargaining positions are
determined by the choice of investment in the second stage of the game. The previous
section has determined the Shapley-value for the homogeneous as well as the
heterogeneous growers’ association when both parties invest. The Shapley value for
the cases when only one party invests is easy to determine because only the investor
and the retailer are essential. They have equal power and therefore receive half of the
revenues.
Define xi as the investment by grower i, where i=1,2. Assume that the growers
take an all or nothing decision regarding their investment, i.e. xi = 0 when grower i
does not invest and xi = 1 when the grower i invests. The vector of investment
decisions is (x1, x2). Figure 1 summarizes the Shapley value for all cases which have to
be considered. Figure 1 summarizes the relationship between the choice of
governance structure, investment and the Shapley value.
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Shapley value
Growers’ association Investment  Player 1  Player 2  Player 3
Homogeneous (0,0) 0 0 0
Homogeneous (1,0) A/2 0 A/2
Homogeneous (0,1) 0 B/2 B/2
Homogeneous (1,1) (3A-2B)/6 B/6 (3A+B)/6
Heterogeneous (1,0) A/2 0 A/2
Heterogeneous (0,1) 0 B/2 B/2
Heterogeneous (1,1) (A+B)/8 (A+B)/8 (A+B)/4
Figure 1: Governance structure, investment, and Shapley value
The above implies that the choice of governance structure does not have an
impact on the Shapley value when only one party invests. The remaining part of this
section is dedicated to the determination of the subgame perfect equilibrium choice of
governance structure when both parties invest. Assume that the costs of the
investment of grower 1 are k1 and the costs of the investment of grower 2 are k2. It is
assumed for computational reasons that grower 1 decides first and grower 2 decides
second in the second stage of the game. Figure 2 presents the extensive form of the
game. Notice that grower 1 decides in the first stage which governance structure will
be chosen. It was determined in the previous section that grower 2 always prefers a
heterogeneous growers’ association above a homogeneous growers’ association. The
payoff of grower 1 determines therefore whether a heterogeneous or homogeneous
growers’ association will be chosen. Grower 1 has also the ability to implement the
choice of growers’ association because grower 2 can be joined in a heterogeneous
growers’ association or a homogeneous growers’ association can be erected3.
                                                                
3 Notice that this differs from the seminal articles of Grossman and Hart (1986) and
Hart and Moore (1990) in which the choice of governance structure is driven by
efficiency considerations. Strategic considerations prevail in our model.
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Figure 2: Extensive form of the game
Figure 3 summarizes the subgame perfect equilibrium choice of governance structure
when 9A ³ 11B. Grower 1 chooses the homogeneous growers’ association (‘Ho’)
because the benefit for grower 1 from avoiding the equality principle regarding
payoffs in a heterogeneous growers’ association (‘He’) is larger than the loss of
countervailing power. If the costs of investment are above a certain level, then the
grower will not invest. The choice of governance structure does not matter anymore in
that situation for the other grower who is still investing. This is indicated by ‘Ho/He’
in figure 3.
Homogeneous
Y N Y N
N
Grower 1
Investment ?
Grower 2
Investment ?NNN YY Y Y
(3A-2B)/6-k 1          A/2-k 1          0                      0                     (A+B)/8-k1             A/2-k1             0                   0   Payoff grower 1
B/6-k 2                          0         B/2-k2                    0                     (A+B)/8-k 2                   0          B/2-k2              0   Payoff grower 2
(3A+B)/6                 A/2          B/2                      0                     (A+B)/4                 A/2              B/2                 0  Payoff processor
Grower 1
Heterogeneous    Grower’ s association
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Figure 4 summarizes the subgame perfect equilibrium choice of governance
structure when 9A < 11B. It is the reverse of figure 3. Notice that the choice of
governance structure is  no longer efficient. Securing countervailing power by
choosing the heterogeneous growers’ association goes at the expensive of efficiency.
The wholesaler looses, but grower 1 (and 2) gain.
k2
B/2
(A+B)/8
B/6
A+B
8
3A-2B
6
A
2
 k1
Ho/ He Ho/He Ho/He
Ho Ho Ho/ He
Ho Ho Ho/ He
Figure 3: Subgame perfect equilibrium choice of governance structure when 9A ³
11B
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5 Conclusion and further research
Traditional cooperatives have faced problems in responding to the increasing
differentiation in demand as well as supply. Growers’ associations may be able to
address these problems because they leave it to the processor/retailer in which
direction they invest in response to the increasing differentiation in demand. Grower
associations face a trade off between self-selection and countervailing power
regarding the increasing differentiation in supply. Heterogeneous growers’
associations frustrate high quality growers due to the policy of uniform treatment of
members, but they are strong in terms of countervailing power of the growers
collectively. The opposite holds for homogeneous growers’ associations.
The above model makes a start with analyzing the emergence of growers’
associations. However, only two governance structures, i.e. the homogeneous and
heterogeneous growers’ association, are addressed. It is therefore implicitly assumed
in the above model that each player owns the assets it is using. Also, only growers are
allowed to invest The incorporation of other governance structures and investment by
the wholesaler can be carried out  along the lines of Hendrikse and Bijman (2001).
This may shed light under which circumstances the traditional cooperatives are
k2
B/2
(A+B)/8
B/6
3A-2B
6
A+B
8
A
2
k1
He/ Ho He He
He He He/ Ho
He He He/ Ho
Figure 4: Subgame perfect equilibrium choice of governance structure when 9A <
11B
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efficient. For example, can a traditional cooperative be efficient and viable when the
difference between low and high quality members increases? Under which
circumstances are grower instructions by the processor/retailer efficient? These
questions will be addressed in future research.
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